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I. INTRODUCTION
As we approach the ten year anniversary of the enactment of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"),' a fairly broad consensus
has emerged that the existing "stovepipe" regulatory framework contained
in the statute is woefully outdated and an impediment to the development
of sound communications policy. 2 So, Congress is beginning to consider
*Randolph J. May is Senior Fellow and Director of Communications Policy Studies at The
Progress and Freedom Foundation, Washington, D.C.
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2. See, e.g., James B. Speta, Deregulating Telecommunications in Internet Time, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1063 (2004); Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward:
Formulating a New Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network
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whether new communications legislation is needed to supplant the 1996
Act. In light of the profound technological and marketplace changes that
have occurred in the last decade, especially those attributable to the
accelerating proliferation of digital technologies and services, any new
legislative reform effort should include an examination of the division
between federal and state regulatory authority, the amalgam of subsidies
known as the Universal Service system, and management of the spectrum.
But there is nothing more important to the project to conceive a new
act than the replacement of the existing statute's stovepipe regulatory
model with a new framework that reflects today's digital age competitive
marketplace realities. Indeed, this effort has to be at the heart of any serious
effort to write what one might call a new Digital Age Communications Act.
The purpose of this brief essay is to show why a replacement
regulatory regime is needed. Its purpose is not to prescribe what the new
model should look like, although I will conclude by suggesting that some
form of market-oriented model should be adopted.

II. THE EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: VERTICAL
STOVEPIPES BASED ON TECHNO-FUNCTIONAL DISTINCTIONS
Stovepipe regulation refers to the fact that (1) the act contains
definitions for variously denominated communications services, such as
"telecommunications," "information services," "cable service," "mobile
service," "broadcasting," and "open video system," and (2) different
regulations apply depending upon a service offering's classification.
Hence, the stovepipes, or vertical "silos" or "smokestacks" as some prefer,
refer to the distinct sets of regulations that attach to a service offering once
it is classified under one definition or the other.
The existing stovepipe regulatory framework no longer makes sense.
With a bit of poetic license, you might say the fires of the digital revolution
have destroyed the stovepipes. In any event, the point is that the old
stovepipe paradigm, with its origins rooted in the original Communications
Act enacted in 1934 ("1934 Act"), is now obsolete.
The current regime is obsolete because the statutory definitions found
in the 1996 Act that are the foundation of the existing regulatory model rest
upon what I have called "techno-functional constructs."3 These technofunctional constructs simply no longer work well in a digital world.4 These
Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587 (2004); Christopher S. Yoo, New Models of
Regulation and Interagency Governance,2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 701.
3. Randolph J. May, Callingfor a Regulatory Overhaul, Bit by Bit, CNET NEws, Oct.
19, 2004, http:llnews.com./Calling+for+a+regulatory+overhaul%2C+bit+by+bit/ 20101028_3-5415778.html.
4. Christopher Yoo has put it this way: "Gone are the days in which each
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particular techno-functional constructs are necessarily implicated in many
of today's most hotly contested regulatory battles, for example, those
involving the statutory definitions of "telecommunications" and
"information service."
Telecommunications is defined as "the transmission, between or
among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing,
without change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received.",5 An information service is "the offering of a capability for
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving,
utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications ... but
does not include any use of any such capability for the management,
control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of
a telecommunications service., 6 Now, these definitions are nothing if not
grounded firmly in techno-functional constructions: transmitting
information among points "specified by the user,"7 "without a change in
"processing," "retrieving,"
form or content," "generating," "storing,"
8
"transforming" information, and so on.
Think for a moment about the meaning these words convey. What
does it mean to say "transforming" information, or transmitting information
between two points "without change in the form or content" of the
information? For example, I send you an instant message, or "IM," typing a
letter in one font on my keyboard. As a result of your or my terminal
settings or Internet Service Provider's protocols, the letter appears on your
screen in another font, or without the smiley face I attached to it. Has there
been a change in form or content of the information sent or received? Has
there been a transformation of the information?

communications technology could be regarded as occupying a separate regulatory silo. The
impending shift of all networks to packet-switched technologies promises to complete the
collapse of any remaining attempt to base regulation on differences in the means of
transmission." Yoo, supra note 2, at 714 (citation omitted).

5. 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2000).
6. § 153(20).
7. § 153(43).
8. § 153(20). The definitions found in the 1996 Act of "telecommunications" and
"information service" essentially track the "basic" and "enhanced" services definitions
developed in the Federal Communication Commission's ("FCC") landmark Computer Il
proceeding to distinguish between regulated transmission services and unregulated online
services employing computer processing. Second Computer Inquiry, Final Decision, 77
F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) [hereinafter Computer I]. They have been interpreted by the FCC to
extend essentially to the same functions so that all of the services the FCC previously
considered to be "enhanced services" are "information services." See Implementation of
Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934 as
amended, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 11

F.C.C.R. 21905, paras. 102--04 (1996).
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This surely is the stuff of digital age philosophers. That is why, in
early 2004 in connection with thinking about the then just-over-the-horizon
but sure-to-come fights regarding the new Internet telephony, or Voice over
Internet Protocol ("VoIP") services, I referred to the distinctions to be
suggested and argued for purposes of regulatory classification as
metaphysical. Certainly, the statute's definitions are in accord with
Webster's definition of metaphysics: (1) "of or relating to what is
conceived as transcendent, supersensible, or transcendental;" (2) "highly
abstract or abstruse;" (3) "expressions of attitudes about which rational
argument is impossible." 9 In fact, so convinced was I of the importance of
hastening an understanding that the current techno-functional regulatory
regime rested on collapsing ground that I could not resist dashing off a
brief commentary
entitled, only half facetiously, The Metaphysics of
°
VoIP.
It is not only the telecommunications and information service
stovepipes which rest on techno-functional constructs. Consider the
statute's "mobile services" definition, which includes terms such as "a
regularly interacting group of base, mobile, portable, and associated control
and relay stations . . ." and so on." The definition of "cable service" turns
on whether the transmissions are "one-way," and either "video
programming" or "other programing service[sl," and whether any
"subscriber interaction" is required for the selection of such video
programming. 12 Whether a transmission is "broadcasting" or not depends
on whether radio communications, which itself turns on whether the
transmission by radio is of writings, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of
all kinds, "intended to be received by the public," are
disseminated,
13
whether "directly or by the intermediary of relay stations."'
However serviceable these definitional constructs may have been at
an earlier time, when analog systems were by far the prevalent
communications transmission mode, they no longer are serviceable in a

9. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1420 (1993).
10. Randolph J. May, The Metaphysics of VoIP, Jan. 5, 2004, CNET NEWS,
http://news.com.com/The+metaphysics+of+VoIP/2010-7352_3-5134896.html. For anyone
interested in immersing him or herself more deeply in communications law metaphysics, I
suggest reading some of the orders in the FCC's almost decade-long effort to settle on a
classification of protocol processing and protocol conversion services. To begin such a
metaphysical feast, sample Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to
Congress, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, paras. 49-52 (1998) [hereinafter Federal-StateJoint Board]
(dealing with the struggle to classify services under the 1996 Act's definitions and the
FCC's ComputerII regime).
11. 47 U.S.C. § 153(27).
12. 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (2000).
13. § 153(6).
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world in which digital technology is rapidly displacing analog. The old
saying "a bit is a bit is a bit" really does have important implications from a
regulatory policy perspective. It is economically, if not technically,
infeasible to distinguish among voice, data, and video bits that travel along
in the same communications stream. In other words, "[o]nce all
communications are reduced to bits and bytes, all media will constitute
substitutes for one another, and attempts to segment markets14based on the
means of conveyance will become increasingly problematic.'
I do not mean to deny the regulators' ingenuity or their good
intentions in creating these definitional constructs, or in striving to render
them serviceable for as long as possible. Take the FCC's landmark
Computer H proceeding from the early 1980s.15 It was then, when data
processing capabilities and communications services first were becoming
intertwined in nascent online applications such as e-mail and data retrieval,
that the FCC created the regulatory distinction between basic and enhanced
service. And it was this distinction that was carried over into the 1996 Act
in the form of the current "telecommunications" and "information services"
definitions. 16 In essence, a basic service was pure transmission capacity
while enhanced services were applications with computer processing
capabilities dependent
upon telecommunications to be carried from one
17
another.
to
place
The FCC's purpose in creating this new distinction was salutary: if
the new online services had been classified as just another form of basic
communications, the services would have been subject to public utilitystyle regulation under the common carrier mandates of Title 1Iof the 1934
Act.' 8 The FCC thought, correctly, that online services could and would
develop on a competitive basis, and therefore, should be free from the
economic regulation to which common carders were subject. 19
Acting under the constraints of the 1934 Act, the FCC's Computer II
decision was sound policy. Online services, from the early CompuServe
and Prodigy services, to the upstart America Online, and on through the
birth and spread of the ubiquitous World Wide Web, did indeed flourish on

14. Yoo, supra note 2, at 714.
15. Computer Ii, supra note 8.

16. See id. and accompanying text.
17. Id. paras. 95-97.
18. Id. para. 114; see also IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 19
F.C.C.R. 4863, para. 25 (2004) [hereinafter IP-Enabled Services] ("Providers of 'basic'
services were subjected to common carrier regulation under Title II of the Act.... [T]he
Commission declined to treat providers of enhanced services as 'common carriers' subject
to regulation under Title II of the Act.") (citations omitted).
19. See Computer H, supra note 8, para. 101; Speta, supra note 2, at 1084.
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an unregulated basis. Without any real controversy, Computer I's "basic"
and "enhanced service" definitions were embodied in essentially the same
form in the 1996 Act as "telecommunications" and "information services."

III. THE PROBLEM: DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND ABUNDANT
BANDWIDTH UNDERMINE THE STOVEPIPES
What once may have been wise policy, and manageably serviceable,
in a predominantly narrowband communications environment is much
more problematic today as broadband networks become more ubiquitous.
Recall that in the narrowband world, at least as a matter of shorthand, we
could, commonly if not universally, equate voice with telecommunications,
data with information services, and video with cable service. For a long
time, limited bandwidth in the narrowband world masked the inherently
problematic nature of the separate techno-functional boundaries upon
which both the 1934 and 1996 acts' regulatory boundaries rested.
The abundant bandwidth of broadband networks, which enables fastgrowing services such as Internet access and VoIP Internet telephony to be
technically and economically viable, tugs mightily at the regulatory mask.
Is high speed cable modem Internet access service "cable,"
"telecommunications," or an "information service"? The FCC deemed
cable modem service an unregulated information service under the 1996
Act's definitional scheme. In June 2005, a divided Supreme Court handed
down a decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v.
Brand X Internet Services, which reversed an appeals court decision
holding
that cable modem service is a combination
of
"telecommunications" and "information service" potentially subject to
public utility-type regulation.20 What about the high speed Digital
Subscriber Line ("DSL") Internet access services offered by the traditional
telephone companies? Until September 2005, when the FCC finally
reclassified it as an unregulated information service not long after the
Brand X decision was handed down, 21 DSL was classified a regulated
telecommunications service.
Next, consider the VoIP Internet telephony services. The FCC has

20. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798
(2002), vacated in part and remanded sub nom. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F. 3d
1120 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd and remanded,National Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n. v. Brand X
Internet Servs., Nos. 04-277 and 04-281, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 5018 (June 27, 2005), 125 S.Ct.
2688 (2005) [hereinafter BrandX1.
21. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet Over Wireline
Facilities, Report and Orderand Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. (forthcoming
2006), 236 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 944 (2005).
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ruled that pulver.com's "Free World Dialup" ("FWD") service, which is a
"computer-to-computer" voice application that does not use ordinary
telephone numbers or originate or terminate calls on the public switched
network, is an information service.22 Following the 1996 Act's formulation,
the FCC concluded that FWD "is an information service because FWD
offers 'a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications.' 23 The FCC added that the fact that FWD happens
"to, among other things, enable members to talk over the Internet," 24 rather
than, for example, play video games, does not affect its characterization as
an information service.
How does the FCC classify the VoIP offering by Vonage, a company
that bills itself as "the broadband telephone company"? 25 Vonage's Digital
Voice customers, who must have access to a broadband connection to
subscribe, make calls that use ordinary telephone numbers and may either
originate or terminate on the public network. The FCC recently acted to
preempt state economic regulation of Vonage's Digital Voice and other
VolP services with similar characteristics, such as those offered by cable
companies, by ruling that they are interstate services.2 6 Pointing to its
already initiated rulemaking regarding VoIP and other IP-enabled services,
the FCC refrained from addressing the classification of Vonage's Digital
Voice and similar services for federal regulatory purposes. But note that the
FCC did point out that Vonage's service '"resembles
the telephone service
27
provided by the circuit-switched network.
In its IP-Enabled Services rulemaking notice, the FCC explains how
the greater bandwidth of broadband networks encourages the introduction
of services "which may integrate voice, video, and data capabilities while
maintaining high quality of service. 28 Then, in a truism, the FCC adds:
"[1]t may become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish
'voice' service from 'data' service, and users may increasingly rely on
22. Petition for Declaratory Ruling that Pulver.com's Free World Dialup is Neither
Telecomm. Nor a Telecomm. Serv., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 3307
(2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs,-public/attachmatchlFCC-04-27A1.pdf
[hereinafter Pulver.com Petition].
23. Id. para. 11 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(20)).
24. Id. para. 19.
25. Vonage Home Page, http://www.vonage.com.
26. Vonage Holdings Corp. Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the
Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 22,404 (2004),
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-04-267A1 .pdf
[hereinafter Vonage Petition].
27. Id. para. 4.
28. IP-EnabledServices, supra note 18, para. 16.
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integrated services using broadband facilities delivered using IP rather than
the traditional PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network)., 29 At the end
of 2004, there already were almost thirty-eight million high-speed
broadband Internet connections in service, an increase of 34% during just
that year. 30 Analysts project that as soon as 2009 there will be twenty-seven
million VoIP lines in service. 3'

IV. THE CONSEQUENCES: COMPARABLE SERVICES ARE
REGULATED DIFFERENTLY UNDER THE STOVEPIPE REGIME
But does it matter that, according to the FCC's own characterization,
Vonage and other providers of similar Internet telephony services that
"enable [users] to talk over the Internet" 32 and "resemble" 33 what we used
to call POTS, or "plain old telephone service," may be regulated very
differently? Does it matter that broadband Internet access services provided
by cable television and telephone companies (and perhaps soon to be
provided by satellite and power companies) may be regulated differently,
even while they already compete vigorously with each other?
Of course it matters. Providers of telecommunications services are
generally subject to price and entry regulation as common carriers;
information services providers are not. 34 Telecommunications services may
be required to be unbundled so that competitors may access the unbundled
network elements at regulated rates.35 Information services are not subject
to mandatory access requirements. Telecommunications services are
subject to certain social obligations, such as universal service contributions
and tax payments, from which non-telecommunications services presently
are exempt. 36 Telecommunications services also are subject to certain
health and safety mandates. For example, telecommunications services
must provide enhanced 911 ("E9 11") service, and are subject to disability
and wiretap capability requirements that are not generally applicable to
non-telecommunications services.3 7 Cable operators are subject to certain
29. Id.
30. See Press Release, FCC, Federal Communications Commission Releases Data on
High-Speed Internet Access Services (July 7, 2005) (explaining that the number of highspeed lines in service at the end of 2004 reported to be 37.9 million).
31. net2phone, 2005 Annual Report 3 (2005), available at http://web.net2phone.com/
about/investor/2005AR.pdf.
32. See Pulver.com Petition, supra note 22, para. 19 and accompanying text.
33. See Vonage Petition, supra note 26, para. 4.
34. See IP-EnabledServices, supra note 18, paras. 24-25.
35. Id. para. 26.
36. See generally Federal-State Joint Board, supra note 10; see also IP-Enabled
Services, supra note 18, paras. 63-66.
37. See IP-EnabledServices, supra note 18, paras. 26, 45-60.
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regulatory obligations that do not apply to non-cable services, such as
obtaining a local franchise and paying local franchise fees.38 States and
localities impose different rights-of-way obligations and fees, depending on
how a service is classified.39
Thus, services that are comparable, at least from the consumers'
perspective, and that compete head-to-head against each other in the
marketplace, are subject to different regulatory requirements based solely
on how the service offerings are classified. For example, despite the fact
that cable operators have had close to twice as many broadband Internet
access subscribers as do the telephone companies, 40 until very recently the
broadband offerings of cable and telephone companies were subject to very
different regulatory regimes.41 In short, the existing service classifications
based upon techno-functional characteristics have little or nothing to do
with how consumers perceive the services or the marketplace position of
the service providers.
V. THE SOLUTION: A NEW MARKET-ORIENTED MARKET
PARADIGM
It should be obvious that a new regulatory framework is needed for
communications policy. My purpose here has been to provide the
background and context for understanding why a new paradigm is needed
rather than to offer any detailed prescription for such regulatory
framework. Nevertheless, in concluding, some general thoughts about the
direction such change should take may not be out of order.
First, what should be avoided is a new framework that just substitutes
one set of techno-functional constructs for another. For example, MCI's
Senior Director for Global Policy and Planning, Richard Whitt, has
proposed that policymakers "adopt a comprehensive legal and regulatory
framework founded on the Internet's horizontal network layers. ' ' 2 He
identifies four layers-content, applications, logical, and physical-that he
claims comprise the Internet's architecture.43 He urges that public policy be
formulated to respect the integrity of the distinct layers for purposes of
determining whether regulation is needed of providers of services within

38. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542 (2000) (authorizing local governments to award
franchises for the provision of cable service and to require payment of franchise fees).
39. See National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 50-State Survey
of Rights-of-Way Statutes, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/staterow/rowtableexcel.htm.
40. See Press Release, FCC, supra note 30.

41. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
42. See Whitt, supra note 2, at 591.
43. Id. at 592.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 58

the layers. 44
Whitt then suggests that the two lower layers, the logical and
physical, should be targeted for discrete regulation based on his claim that
significant market power resides in these layers. 45 The physical layer
roughly corresponds to the network facilities of the cable, telephone,
satellite, wireless, and other companies that transport information. The
logical layer roughly corresponds to the software codes and protocols, such
as Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol ("TCP/IP"), that
interface with the physical layer below and the applications and content
layers above.
Whitt calls this proposed layers model "a horizontal leap
' 46
forward.
But turning stovepipes on their side is not necessarily a leap forward;
rather, it is an invitation to stultify the continued evolution of our physical
networks and the service applications that may be integrated into such
networks. It is difficult to predict, especially in a technologically dynamic
environment, how network platforms, or the Internet, really an
interconnected network of network platforms, will evolve on a technical or
functional basis. Today's seemingly discrete Internet layers may be
obsolete, or at least meaningfully altered, tomorrow.
What is needed is a new market-oriented model that breaks with the
past, not a replacement regime based on just another set of technofunctional constructs. 47 A market-oriented model that employs antitrust law
or antitrust-like principles would focus on the structure of the marketplace:
whether individual service providers possess market power that should be
constrained by some form of regulation, and whether such constraints
generally should be applied in the form of ex ante proscriptions or more
narrowly-tailored ex post remedial orders. Such a market-oriented model
would put the focus on the consumer-and consumer welfare-where it
belongs, not on distinctions grounded in particular technology platforms or
arcane functional characteristics that have little to do with existing
marketplace realities. It would greatly reduce the opportunities for
regulatory gaming that are inherent in the current regime.
Thus, under this approach, comparable services ("substitutable"
services in antitrust parlance) from the consumers' perspective would not
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 587.
47. What is also needed is a slimmer, more efficient, and more accountable regulatory
agency with jurisdiction over communications, in other words, a transformed and reformed
FCC. But that is another story unto itself. See Randolph J. May, The FCC's Tumultuous
Year 2003: An Essay on an Opportunityfor InstitutionalAgency Reform, 56 ADMIN. L. REV.
1307 (2004).
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be subject to differential regulatory treatment just because they are
delivered over different technology platforms or employ different
functional bells and whistles. By the same token, comparable services
might be subjected to differential regulatory treatment if there is a marketoriented reason to do so in order to enhance consumer welfare.
After all, any regulatory regime ultimately should be judged based on
whether or not it advances or impairs marketplace competition and
promotes consumer welfare, not on whether it advances or impairs the
prospects of particular competitors, or protects the jobs of current
regulators.

114
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